By FORMER Nigerian military president, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, has revealed how the ill-fated Gideon Orkar coup of April 22, 1990, took him by surprise.
In his autobiography, A Journey in Service, launched in Abuja on February 20, 2024 and obtained by Stonix News, he described the events of that fateful night and the measures taken to suppress the mutiny.
Babangida recounted how he had retired for the night after his usual routine at Dodan Barracks, only to be alerted by his wife, Maryam, about unusual troop movements within the premises.
“She rushed back to me from the bathroom and reported that she had noticed some unusual movements outside,” he wrote.
Upon inspecting the situation himself, he realised that soldiers not part of his usual security detail were taking up strategic positions. As he tried to process the development, gunfire erupted, shattering the windows of his residence.
“Very shortly afterwards, small arms firing commenced. This was followed by heavy artillery bombardment of the residential quarters,” he recalled.
His aide-de-camp (ADC), Lieutenant Colonel U.K. Bello, immediately took charge of the situation, organising the presidential guards to defend the residence.
Despite Babangida’s insistence on staying put, his security team successfully extracted him and his family to separate safe houses far from Dodan Barracks, which had been reduced to rubble.
Meanwhile, loyal troops engaged the coup plotters, though they faced challenges. Babangida recounted how U.K. Bello attempted to deploy a military tank near the residence, only to discover that the rebels had sabotaged it.
President Bola Tinubu with former Military President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida
Nonetheless, loyal forces, under the command of General Sani Abacha, mobilised to counter the coup attempt.
During the chaos, Orkar and his co-conspirators had taken over the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN), broadcasting a speech announcing the removal of Babangida’s government. However, the counter-operation was already in motion.
“The critical command was put on alert. General Sani Abacha took control of the loyal forces as necessary and constantly communicated progress in the operation to foil the coup,” Babangida noted.
By late morning, the coup had been suppressed. The rebels, realising their efforts had failed, attempted to flee. Martial music replaced the treasonous broadcast on FRCN as arrests commenced across Lagos and beyond.
Military formations nationwide reaffirmed their loyalty to Babangida’s administration.
Reflecting on the attempted coup, Babangida expressed disappointment upon discovering that some of the ringleaders were men he had personally supported.
“I was saddened by the revelation of some of the coup’s ringleaders. I had known many of them personally and helped them in their careers and personal affairs,” he lamented.
Orkar, for instance, had been a regular visitor from his base in Shaki, Oyo State, while another key plotter, Colonel Tony Nyiam, frequently wrote to Dodan Barracks with suggestions on national issues. Babangida found their betrayal particularly painful.
He also criticised the content of the coup broadcast, which called for the secession of five northern states and interference in the Sokoto Sultanate.
“The informed populace condemned these laughable and adolescent accusations and proposals,” he wrote, adding that the public reaction further solidified national unity.
Following the failed coup, Babangida’s government swiftly prosecuted the perpetrators, who were found guilty of treason. He acknowledged that the incident reinforced Nigerians’ confidence in the country’s sovereignty and integrity.
“Even if the coup attempt was not as sloppy as it was, the public received very negatively the broadcast of certain states being expelled from the federation,” he noted.
Beyond military action, Babangida believed the coup revealed significant communication gaps within the armed forces.
He suggested that misinformation and misunderstanding of government policies might have contributed to the rebels’ grievances.
In response, his administration introduced reforms to improve engagement with the military rank and file. “We set up a mechanism for regular information on key government policies and programmes for armed forces members,” he wrote.
The government also launched Armed Forces Consultative Assemblies across military formations, allowing soldiers to engage directly with senior officials.
These initiatives, Babangida argued, helped eliminate dangerous rumours and ensured that troops felt included in national governance.
Additionally, efforts were made to bridge the gap between the government and the public through better communication strategies.
“We carried out further overhauls of the government’s communication and information gap between the public and the administration,” Babangida concluded.
Despite the harrowing experience, he believed the country emerged stronger. “The failure of the coup attempt was also the failure of divisive forces in both the military and the polity,” he said, reaffirming his view that Nigeria’s unity had been tested but ultimately strengthened.
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